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Competition, Patronage and Fragmentation: 
The Limits of Bottom-Up Approaches to 
Security Governance in Ituri
Kasper Hoffmann*,†, Koen Vlassenroot† and Karen Büscher†
People are affected by different kinds of insecurity in the Ituri Province in the 
northeastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This article 
investigates donor-driven attempts to improve security governance there. More 
specifically, it investigates bottom-up approaches to security governance in Ituri’s 
capital of Bunia and in Irumu territory. Whereas in Bunia people are faced with 
high levels of violent crime, Irumu is the site of a violent conflict between the Ituri 
Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI), an armed group connected to the Ngiti commu-
nity, and the Congolese army. Involving local non-state security actors in security 
governance is perceived by international and national actors as a  pragmatic way 
to improve security conditions. However, we show that these bottom-up security 
governance initiatives have not succeeded in resolving the issues that generate 
insecurity. We argue that this is because the drivers of insecurity in northeast-
ern Congo are translocal and too complex for localised bottom-up approaches to 
 significantly change the status quo.
Introduction
Classic donor approaches to state-building 
and security governance in conflict and 
post-conflict contexts usually adhere to a 
Weberian understanding of the modern 
western state, characterized by its monopoly 
on the legitimate use of coercion, its effec-
tive assertion of public authority, and its 
legal-rational bureaucracy. Internationally 
supported state-building policies tend to 
aim at rebuilding the institutions of so-
called fragile or failed states in the global 
south in this Weberian image of the mod-
ern state. This policy has been driven by the 
assumption that only by building western-
style public institutions, would these states 
be able deliver security,  development and 
other public goods to citizens.
The policies usually entail comprehensive 
security sector reform (SSR). In most cases, 
SSR concentrates on reforming the formal 
arrangements of the state and its security and 
justice institutions, focusing on clear objec-
tives such as stronger mechanisms of civilian 
control, parliamentary accountability, budg-
etary management, and the training and 
professionalization of police, army and the 
judiciary (Bagayoko et al. 2016; Schroeder et 
al. 2014). It is anticipated that these reforms 
will create security services that both respect 
stability
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basic human rights and effectively combat 
security threats posed by rebel movements, 
terrorist groups or  criminal gangs.
The Turn to the Local in Peacebuilding
Disillusionment with the results of the for-
malistic and state-centric approach to SSR 
has provoked criticism and introspection. The 
failures of top-down state and peacebuild-
ing interventions led to an acknowledgment 
among policy-makers that the exclusion of 
local arenas by the central state inhibits state 
legitimacy. As a result, policy-makers have 
pushed for exploring the conflict-mitigating 
potential of local governance (Leonardsson 
and Rudd 2015: 828). While the UN empha-
sizes the vital link between local capacity and 
ownership in peacebuilding processes (UN 
2010), DFID and the United States Institute 
for Peace (USIP) suggest building on already 
local formal and informal institutions, and 
supporting systems that strengthen civil 
society and link traditional authorities with 
local governance structures (DFID 2010; 
USIP 2012). Along these lines, it has been 
argued that non-state security actors could 
be included as viable partners in the gov-
ernance of security in fragile contexts. As a 
result of such narratives, references to local 
non-state security actors have crept into 
state-building and SSR toolkits (Bagayoko 
et. 2016: 2). For instance, while the OECD 
has called for a ‘multi-layered’ approach to 
SSR, which includes local non-state security 
actors (Scheye and McLean 2006), DFID has 
argued that ‘non-state systems’ may play a 
critical role in restoring security in the after-
math of war (DFID 2004).
Some scholars and NGO activists advo-
cate for an even more profound change of 
peacebuilding based on local agency (e.g. 
Autesserre 2010; Boege et al. 2008, 2009; 
Jarstad and Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2015; Richmond 2010). They crit-
icize mainstream international peacebuild-
ing agendas either for ignoring local agency 
beyond its rhetorical inclusion in policy 
papers or seeing it as an instrument for the 
implementation of liberal peace. SSR, in 
particular, has been criticized for reinforc-
ing elite interests. This implies that donors 
may be complicit in deepening structural 
inequalities, creating insecurity and deep-
ening social divisions (Jackson 2015). Critics 
argue that attempts to export western-style 
institutions to conflict and post-conflict sit-
uations are doomed to fail because they are 
perceived as illegitimate locally and differ 
dramatically from how security is governed 
on the ground (e.g. Boege et al. 2008; Mac 
Ginty 2010, 2011; Richmond and Franks 
2009; Scheye 2009). These critiques have 
paved the way for the ‘local turn’ in the 
peacebuilding literature (Paffenholz 2015). 
It is argued that by ignoring local agency, in 
spite of rhetoric to the contrary, peacebuild-
ing will necessarily fail because its design 
rests on externally imposed legitimacy and 
norms (Richmond 2011: 119). Only by tap-
ping into local forms of peacebuilding, 
can more self-sustaining forms of peace 
emerge (Autesserre 2007; Mac Ginty 2010; 
Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Richmond 
2012; Roberts 2011). In the case of the DRC, 
Séverine Autesserre has recently argued 
that local matters such as poor access to 
land, justice, and education, are at the root 
of Congo’s longstanding violence and that 
these factors should be dealt with by local 
actors and mechanisms promoting peace 
and reconciliation (Autesserre 2017).
In recent years, however, some scholars 
have claimed that the notion of the ‘local’ 
as espoused by the peacebuilding literature 
is problematic. It is argued that whatever is 
considered local is always made within the 
dynamics of larger, even global encoun-
ters. Furthermore, the notion of ‘the local’ 
remains under conceptualised and is often 
taken for granted, as something ‘out there’, 
typically represented as ‘indigenous’, ‘cus-
tomary’, or ‘traditional’, to be discovered, 
understood, or empowered (Autesserre 
2010; Richmond 2010; Roberts 2008; Boege 
et al. 2009; MacGinty 2010; MacGinty 2008; 
Chopra and Hohe 2004). This is leading to 
a depoliticisation and reification of the local 
in peacebuilding literature (Hirblinger and 
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Simons 2015; Hoffmann and Kirk 2013; 
Sabaratnam 2013: 267).
The Argument
In this article, we contribute to this debate 
by investigating attempts by international 
organizations to govern security through 
local actors in the Ituri province in northeast-
ern DRC. In doing so, it provides an analysis 
and critique of current international efforts to 
harness local agency in security governance. 
More specifically, it investigates ‘bottom-
up’ security governance in Ituri’s capital of 
Bunia (section 2), which is facing a high level 
of violent crime, and in the Irumu territory 
(section 3), which is the site of a violent con-
flict between Forces de Résistance Patriotique 
d’Ituri (Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri 
– FRPI), a militia connected to the Ngiti 
community, and the Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo (Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo – FARDC), which receives support 
from the UN peacekeeping mission in the 
Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies pour la Stabilisation en République 
Démocratique du Congo – United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR 
Congo, MONUSCO).1
Our analysis shows that attempts to har-
ness local agency in security governance 
is not merely rhetoric by external actors. 
Rather local non-state actors have increas-
ingly been engaged in efforts to improve the 
security situation. However, we argue that 
this engagement with local non-state actors 
has not led to a durable solution to people’s 
daily security problems, largely because the 
dynamics fuelling insecurity are not lim-
ited to the local level and are too complex 
for bottom-up approaches to significantly 
change the status quo. One main argument, 
therefore, is that while local security actors 
were empowered by international support, 
such support challenged existing security 
actors, which led to intensified competition 
in the field of security governance, affecting 
security conditions themselves. Based on our 
findings, we argue that security governance 
should not only be understood as a universal 
public good to be maximised, but rather as a 
highly contested political issue, which, ulti-
mately, is about who has the right to enforce 
a certain political order. Security governance 
is, therefore, always for someone, and not for 
everyone.
Method
Data for this paper was gathered during 
a 10-day field trip in September 2015. We 
make no claim that our study constitutes an 
in-depth ethnography; yet the authors have 
extensive research experience in eastern 
Congo, including in Ituri (see Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2004). In total, 26 inter-
views were conducted with UN agencies, 
NGOs representatives, and government offi-
cials as well as non-state security actors and 
key informants (civil society activists and 
university professors).2 Furthermore, data 
gathered during the field research was tri-
angulated with relevant academic literature, 
news articles, official statistics and reports of 
NGOs and the UN.
Urban Security Governance: The 
Case of Bunia
Between 1999 and 2003, Ituri was the scene 
of one of the most horrendous episodes 
of the Congo Wars that led to the death of 
more than 55,000 people and displaced 
hundreds of thousands more (HRW 2003; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004). The 
mass-scale violence in 2003 prompted the 
EU to intervene in support of the UN peace-
keeping mission, which was no longer able 
to manage the situation. One year later, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted 
four of the leaders of Ituri’s armed groups. 
However, violent conflict and insecurity per-
sisted, especially in the rural areas. In 2007, 
after significant military pressure from the 
peacekeeping forces and the Congolese 
army, leaders of the remaining armed 
groups joined the Congolese army (Fahey, 
2013; Tamm 2013). However, in Irumu ter-
ritory, where the FRPI armed groups contin-
ued to operate, everyday security conditions 
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remained precarious. Furthermore, a new 
series of armed attacks too place between 
December 2017 and March 2018 in Djugu 
territory revealing how fragile the security 
situation is. Djugu was one of the hotbeds of 
violence during the Ituri conflict, but it has 
been considered a stable since 2007. Yet in 
December 2017 Lendu youth started attack-
ing Lendu villages again. More than 100.000 
people fled the area in search of security. 
Among these 40.000 fled into Uganda. 
The attacks shows that the underlying driv-
ers of conflict have not been resolved and 
undermine the legitimacy of the Congolese 
authorities and security services due to their 
inability protect people. At the same time, 
it further weakens MONUSCO for its lack 
of capacity to protect civilians, despite that 
being a key pillar of its mandate.
Furthermore, in Bunia, where security 
conditions have considerably improved 
since 2007, its residents continue to deal 
with a wide range of interconnected politi-
cal, military, social and economic issues, 
which combine to produce an insecure and 
unpredictable environment (Hoffmann et 
al. 2016: 5; Pottier 2010: 30). Especially in 
the peri-urban areas of Bunia, there is a high 
rate of violence, a rise in drug and alcohol 
abuse, abusive and extractive authorities, 
illegal roadblocks, kidnapping and armed 
robberies (CDJP 2011; CDJP 2010; CDJP 
2011b; CDJP 2011c; CDJP 2012a; CDJP 
2014; Rapport annuel 2014; UNDP 2012; 
UNDP 2015b).3 Another issue that is con-
sistently referred to as a significant source 
of insecurity is the easy access to small 
arms, despite different disarmament efforts 
(UNDP 2012; UNDP 2015b).4 Additionally, 
access to security is very unequally distrib-
uted. Whereas the wealthy can afford to 
pay expensive private security companies 
or privately hire policemen or soldiers for 
their own protection,5 the vast majority of 
the population has to rely on the ineffi-
cient and resource-starved Congolese secu-
rity services or self-organised local security 
actors, or techniques of self-protection 
(Hoffmann et al. 2016: 5).
Engaging the Local in 
Security Governance
The precarious security situation in Bunia in 
the aftermath of the war prompted  concerned 
international and local organisations to try 
to improve the security  conditions in the 
city. One of these initiatives was the creation 
of platforms that engage both local state 
and non-state security actors in exchang-
ing information and coordinating security 
governance efforts. At the municipal level, a 
Local Proximity Security Committee (Comité 
de Sécurité Locale de Proximité) is organised 
on a weekly basis. The mayor of Bunia, who is 
the highest administrative authority in town, 
heads it. Participants include the neighbour-
hood chiefs, the Proximity Police (Police de 
Proximité), elected members of civil society, 
and international donors. At the neighbour-
hood level, Neighbourhood Forums (Forums 
des Quartiers) are regularly held, during 
which inhabitants can present and discuss 
their security problems with local authori-
ties and the Proximity Police. Every week, the 
mayor reports the security situation to the 
security committee of the Ituri province, in 
which all the major formal security services 
are represented (intelligence services, immi-
gration services, army, police, the head of 
Ituri province, MONUSCO, etc.). There is also 
the Urban Assembly (Assemblée Urbaine), 
created by international and local NGOs, 
which is held every trimester. It convenes 
state security services (intelligence services, 
immigration services, army, police, the head 
of Ituri province) and MONUSCO and local 
non-state security actors.
All of these platforms are meant to ensure 
that the different actor’s engaged with secu-
rity governance collaborate in providing 
security to the residents of Bunia. However, 
the provision of security is severely ham-
pered not only by problems related to coor-
dination, resources and communication, but 
also by competition between the different 
actors involved and the structural factors 
fuelling insecurity, not least of which are the 
clientilistic norms prevalent in the Congolese 
security services. This can be illustrated by 
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the difficulties and challenges faced by two 
projects intended to harness local agency for 
the improvement of the security situation in 
Bunia: The Local Participative Governance 
Committees (Comités locaux de gouvern-
ance participative), which are funded by two 
international NGOs, the Diocesan Justice 
and Peace Commission (Caritas) and IKV 
Pax Christi; and the Proximity Police units, 
which are funded by the UNDP in Bunia.
The Local Participative 
Governance Committees
The Local Participative Governance 
Committees were created in 2010 as an 
initiative of Diocesan Justice and Peace 
Commission and IKV Pax Christi, in partner-
ship with Congolese NGO network Reseau 
Haki na Amani (Reconciliation and Peace 
Network). The primary objectives of the 
Local Participative Governance Committees 
were to engage youth in crime prevention in 
Bunia’s 12 neighbourhoods,6 and to create a 
forum through which its youth could regu-
larly meet with the formal security services 
(army, police, immigration and intelligence 
services) and politico-administrative author-
ities (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 7).
By engaging the youth in crime  prevention, 
the involved NGOs sought to simultaneously 
harness their potential as security provid-
ers and transform vigilante groups into 
non-violent security actors (CDJP 2012b).7 
Additionally, they hoped to create syner-
gies between existing youth organisations, 
including confessional youth groups, the 
association of taxi drivers (many of whom 
are former militia members), art groups, 
street kids (called shegue and maibobo), and 
political party youth groups.8 This was seen 
as a way to avoid conflict and competition 
between these groups. One of the important 
roles of the Local Participative Governance 
Committees was to produce improved doc-
umentation on the local security situation, 
as the government system was not working 
due to a lack of means and unmotivated 
local officials.9 However, the project cre-
ated suspicion among the security services, 
who thought that the Local Participative 
Governance Committees had stepped into 
their domain and were concerned that they 
would expose and denounce their illegal 
revenue-generating activities.10
These concerns must be seen in light 
of the clientilistic norms prevalent in the 
Congolese security services. Authority does 
not simply follow the formal hierarchy in 
the Congolese security services. Rather, the 
latter consist of a collection of competing 
patron-client networks. These networks can 
be based on different relationships such 
as shared ethnic or geographical origins, 
past army unit affiliation, or former armed 
group membership. Forced to serve their 
patrons and living in precarious conditions 
themselves, security agents constantly try 
to exploit the benefits of their position to 
illegally collect resources from civilians (a 
practice that usually involves an element 
of coercion), or through forging profitable 
links with criminal actors. This creates a 
context of constant unpredictability about 
the conduct of these agents and tends to 
result in increased insecurity for Congolese 
civilians (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
2013). A striking example of how security 
forces’ illegal revenue-generating activities 
fuel insecurity in Bunia took place when 
Colonel Bonane Habarugira was deployed 
as deputy commander between 2011 and 
2013.11 During this period, urban crime lev-
els increased (UNDP 2015b) with Bonane 
being reported as sponsoring criminal 
networks in Bunia, including by providing 
weapons (UNSC 2014).
Partly as result of the spike in insecurity 
during Bonane’s deployment, the Local 
Participative Governance Committees 
began to reinforce and support existing 
local community alert systems in 2012.12 
These committees provided neighbourhood 
inhabitants with megaphones, whistles, 
cans, and alarm bells so they could alert 
the youth and security services when inci-
dents occurred. As mentioned, the project also 
sought to improve the strenuous relationship 
between the youth and their neighbourhoods, 
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on the one hand, and the Congolese security 
forces and politico-administrative authori-
ties, on the other. This was done through the 
creation of an Urban Assembly. During its 
meetings, members of the Local Participative 
Governance Committees would try to per-
suade the police to intensify their patrols 
in the most problematic areas, as indicated 
by collected statistics. However, youth have 
expressed fear of reporting security incidents 
to local authorities, especially in cases where 
people believed that the police or army were 
involved, because ‘you never know who is 
invited to the Urban Assembly meetings’.13
This project has produced some positive 
effects on local security governance: it has 
led to an improved documentation of secu-
rity incidents; created a platform through 
which local communities can approach 
the Congolese security forces and authori-
ties; and helped to support an existing alert 
system. After some time, Congolese state 
authorities also began to appreciate the 
collaboration with the Local Participative 
Governance Committees, which provided 
them with valuable information.
Despite these effects, the relationship 
between local youth and the police remains 
tense. Distrust in the police continues to be 
high, not only because they often do not 
show up when a violent crime has been 
committed, but even more so because they 
are believed to be complicit in acts of crime. 
According to different sources, police offic-
ers rent their guns to bandits and take part 
in armed robberies.14 At the same time, secu-
rity forces continue to be engaged in illegal 
revenue-generating activities. Moreover, the 
police can easily be bribed, which means 
that while criminals are often let go, inno-
cent people are arrested, or worse, and police 
officers impose self-invented infractions, 
fees and fines on people. As a result, some 
youth groups have unsuccessfully requested 
that the police no longer enter their neigh-
bourhoods after sunset, unless they receive 
permission from their superiors, and then 
also only if the youth are allowed to partici-
pate in the patrols.
Such dynamics create a general sense of 
distrust and suspicion by urban inhabitants 
towards the security services.15 According to 
a recent survey, 36 per cent of people in the 
area believed that the police protected the 
population in Bunia, 24 per cent thought 
that they did nothing, 33 per cent believed 
that they were involved in crime, and 7 per 
cent were not sure (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 
9).16 The alleged passivity and complicity of 
the Congolese security forces has also encour-
aged some local youth to revert to their for-
mer roles as vigilantes. In such cases, revenge 
or deterrence could lead them to hurting or 
even killing people. In rare cases, youth have 
even attacked police officers or soldiers, who 
they suspect of involvement with other violent 
incidents. However, vigilante justice is risky as 
people from the victims’ social network may 
take revenge and trigger vicious cycles of 
tit-for-tat violence.17 Furthermore, the Local 
Participative Governance Committees do not 
represent all youth in the city. Many youth 
do not acknowledge them as legitimate secu-
rity actors and sometimes confuse them with 
state security actors or see them as complicit 
with the latter.18
The Proximity Police
An important new actor in urban secu-
rity provision in Bunia is the Proximity 
Police (Police de proximité). It was initiated 
in 2009 as part of a larger GDP 60 million 
police reform programme (the Security 
Sector Accountability and Police Reform, 
SSAPR), funded principally by the UK and 
the European Commission (Boshoff et al. 
2010; Thill et al 2018). The objective of the 
intervention was to transform the Congolese 
police into a Police de Proximité force capa-
ble of providing protection to the Congolese 
population through regular popular consul-
tation and more direct contact with civilians. 
It aimed at strengthening police-community 
partnerships and turn police forces into a 
more accountable institution. However, from 
the outset senior police chiefs and members 
of the government showed little interest in 
reforming the police institutions that are 
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considered important instruments of power 
and of resource generation, and thus kept 
under the firm control of those profiting 
from them (Boshoff et al. 2010: 14).19
For donors supporting police reform, 
the Proximity Police is meant to be a guid-
ing philosophy to be applied for the entire 
Congolese National Police (Police Nationale 
Congolaise). With its creation, donors sought 
to increase trust between the population and 
the police and improve communal security 
by harnessing local energies.20 Pilot projects 
were launched in four major cities around 
the DRC: Matadi (Bas-Congo), Bukavu (South 
Kivu), Kinshasa, Kananga (Western Kasai) and 
Bunia (Ituri). For Bunia, a total of 260 civil-
ians have been recruited and trained since 
September 2013 (PNUD 2015). Following a 
sensitisation campaign carried out by local 
NGOs, these recruits were deployed in five of 
the city’s most insecure neighbourhoods in 
2014 (PNUD 2015).21 To harness local ener-
gies in improving security provision, the 
UNDP and the Congolese authorities also 
created Neighbourhood Forums (Forum des 
Quartiers). In these forums, civilians are pro-
vided the opportunity to discuss their secu-
rity problems with local authorities and the 
Proximity Police. The Proximity Police can 
then relay these problems to the municipal 
level security committee.
However, the Proximity Police’s capacity 
to improve security in Bunia is hampered for 
several reasons. Firstly, these newly trained 
police officers lack sufficient resources 
to cover their operating costs, despite 
donor support. Secondly, when problems 
arose with the timely payment of salaries, 
Proximity Police officers started quitting 
their jobs. Thirdly, since the Proximity Police 
are unarmed, they are faced with consider-
able constraints when intervening against 
armed bandits (UNDP 2015a). Fourthly, the 
creation of the Proximity Police has produced 
new competition within the already deeply 
divided Congolese National Police. Having 
received training, new equipment and build-
ings, Proximity Police officers faced resent-
ment from some of their colleagues in the 
police force.22 Finally, concerns rose about 
the sustainability of the positive conduct 
of the Proximity Police after donor funding 
was no longer secured in 2015. It was feared 
that the Proximity Police would in the end 
become an additional source of coercion, 
developing similar practices to other secu-
rity services.
Soon after its deployment, the Bunia 
population became disappointed with the 
Proximity Police, accusing them of gradu-
ally taking over the ‘bad habits’ (corruption, 
 extortion, passivity etc.) of their colleagues 
in the police force.23 The critique of the 
Proximity Police in Bunia also affects peo-
ple’s attitudes towards donors, who, along 
with the government, are accused of being 
responsible for increased competition within 
the police and for the lack of improved 
security conditions (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 
11–12). These conclusions are in line with 
dynamics observed in Bukavu, where police 
reform prematurely ended following donor 
reactions against the brutal repression of 
youth gangs by police forces in Kinshasa as 
part of operation Likofi in 2013 and 2014. 
Thill et al (2018) argue that patronage struc-
tures guiding revenue generation activities 
and loyalty structures within the police, 
as well as the contradiction between the 
democratic and preventative principles of 
this reform process and the repressive force 
needed for regime security, are among the 
main reasons why security reform has made 
limited progress. As they state, ‘despite some 
successes, ambitious donor-funded police 
reform programmes have not sufficiently 
taken into account the political economy of 
the police and how their intended reform 
initiatives may impact institutional incen-
tives and hidden interests’ (Thill et al 2018).  
The above shows that international 
donors’ engagement with local actors in 
security governance is not just rhetoric. 
They have tried alternative ways to provide 
security to Bunia’s inhabitants, have funded 
existing non-state actors through the Local 
Participative Governance Committees and 
have funded and pushed for the creation of 
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the Proximity Police to respond to local secu-
rity needs. Yet, our research indicates that the 
effects of these projects have been rather lim-
ited, as they do not address the complex of 
interconnected social, political and economic 
factors that combine to produce urban inse-
curity. The Local Participative Governance 
Committees and the Proximity Police do 
not act in a vacuum, but are part of a larger 
political and social context, conditioned by a 
political economy that itself is characterised 
by patronage politics and high levels of struc-
tural violence, and that informs and guides 
the conduct of security actors. Even if they 
had been fully resourced and received the 
best training available, these police forces 
would still be subjected to the pressures and 
constraints of the larger context marked by 
poverty, violent crime, political tension and 
fierce competition over power and (lim-
ited) resources. Similarly, Eriksson Baaz and 
Ohlsen (2011), who have studied unofficial 
economic activities within the Congolese 
police, conclude that an increase in logistical 
capacity and better salaries are no guarantee 
that security services will be transformed 
into less violent and predatory actors.
Even more, supporting such actors chal-
lenges the coercive authority of existing 
state security actors, who benefit from the 
status quo. In the end, this generates further 
competition and even resistance in the field 
of security governance and hampers the pro-
vision of security services. In other words, the 
potential of such ‘bottom-up’ approaches to 
improve security provision in urban contexts 
can only be understood when taking into 
account the broader context. It explains why 
such strategies have unpredictable political 
effects. This is particularly the case in areas 
such as northeastern DRC, where political 
and coercive authority is deeply fragmented 
and contested (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 12).
Bottom-Up Security Governance in 
the Context of Violent Conflict in 
Irumu Territory
Different initiatives to improve security con-
ditions by mobilising local non-state actors 
have also been developed in Ituri’s rural areas. 
In this section, we outline how MONUSCO 
has engaged with local non-state actors to 
improve security for civilians. MONUSCO has 
a broad mandate to simultaneously protect 
the civilian population, neutralise armed 
groups, stabilise the country and restore 
state authority. Aligning these mandates has 
proven difficult. MONUSCO has provided 
critical lessons on peacekeeping for the UN 
Security Council and the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, which in recent 
publications recognise the importance of 
local conflict drivers and the reinforce-
ment of local capacities to tackle insecurity 
(UN 2015; UNSC 2015b). As a result of these 
lessons and critiques, MONUSCO has gradu-
ally transformed into a vehicle for the devel-
opment of new approaches to peacekeeping, 
including supporting and working with local 
non-state actors (Stearns 2015).
The FRPI is the last remaining armed group 
from the Ituri war. The reasons for its exist-
ence and its modes of operation are similar 
to a number of armed groups operating in 
eastern Congo. Its authority is drawn from 
the historical grievances of the Ngiti com-
munity, which it claims to protect against 
neighbouring communities and the govern-
ment (cf. Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014). 
However, at the same time, it is also deeply 
involved in acts of extortion and abuse and 
contributes to the creation of insecurity. In 
other words, it is an armed group, which 
gradually evolved from a community protec-
tion force to a source of insecurity.
The Failure of Carrot and 
Stick Solutions
A combination of negotiation and force has 
been used to counter the FRPI. Negotiations 
between the group and Congolese authori-
ties took place between November 2014 and 
January 2015 and again in May–June 2015. 
As in most negotiations with armed groups, 
the talks with the FRPI focused on issues 
such as the recognition of military ranks, 
amnesty,24 and one-off payments (UNSC, 
2015a). Talks in January 2015 failed because 
of the arrest of the FRPI leader, Cobra Matata. 
In June 2015, additional demands from the 
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FRPI and its refusal to deliver military equip-
ment put an end to the negotiations. This 
led to new clashes between the FRPI and the 
Congolese armed forces around Aveba in the 
Walendu-Bindi chiefdom. In June 2015, the 
FARDC and MONUSCO changed strategies 
and started carrying out joint operations 
against the FRPI (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 14).
Despite the military operations and nego-
tiations towards demobilisation, the FRPI 
remains a key actor in the politico-military 
landscape of Ituri and the Irumu territory. 
Today, however, it is highly fragmented and 
no longer able to control significant territory. 
Previously, the group had its own taxation 
system for generating revenue, but now it is 
increasingly relying on robberies, looting and 
extortion, particularly during market-days 
and along main roads (UNSC 2015a).
The group’s relation with local society 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, it tries to 
coerce local authorities to obey them while 
also abusing and extorting ordinary peo-
ple.25 On the other hand, the group is still 
considered by residents as a protection force 
of the Ngiti community, which has histori-
cally faced marginalisation and exclusion. 
They are perceived as ‘children of the com-
munity’ and local residents are hesitant to 
collaborate with local authorities in combat-
ting them. A UN community liaison assistant 
told us that the local population often tell 
them that the FRPI fighters are ‘children of 
the village, (so) we cannot ask the soldiers to 
go and shoot them’.26 Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish combatants from civilians 
and local civilian specialists of traditional 
medicine, called ‘lenga na kisi’ are among 
the group’s leaders.27 Also some customary 
chiefs are in direct and constant contact with 
the armed group.28
Sources claim that neither Kinshasa nor 
the FRPI leadership ever really intended to 
reach an agreement. It is argued that for 
the fragmented FRPI leadership, these talks 
were considered as an opportunity to get 
access to food and other resources.29 Others 
point to the provision of support to the FRPI 
by political and community leaders from 
the area, including members of parliament, 
and attempts to prevent a further demobi-
lization of the group because of its strate-
gic importance as a reserve force.30 A local 
reserve force can potentially be utilised by 
political actors as leverage during negotia-
tions and to mobilise support for the Irumu 
territory.31 Sources told the United Nations 
Group of Experts that the Congolese govern-
ment does not want to integrate the FRPI 
into the Congolese army (UNSC, 2015a). 
Kinshasa is believed to want to dismantle 
the armed group to demonstrate to the 
international community that maintain-
ing stability is mainly a law-and-order issue 
(UNSC, 2015a).32 At the same time, rumours 
are circulating that certain officers in the 
Congolese army are not interested in find-
ing a solution to the problem as the opera-
tions against the FRPI increase their budgets 
and provide access to income derived from 
informal taxation of the local population 
(Hoffmann et al. 2016: 14). These allegations 
have a history. Already in 2010, unspecified 
Congolese authorities, told a UN Group of 
Experts that the FARDC was involved in tax-
ing gold mining in Geti in the FRPI heartland 
(UNSC 2010: 67).
The deployment of units from the 
Congolese armed forces has aggravated inse-
curity at the local level. The Congolese army 
is accused of extorting and abusing popula-
tions in the areas it cleared in South Irumu, 
which is a pattern that goes back to earlier 
operations against the FRPI (Justice Plus 
2007).33 Subjected to abuse and extortion by 
the army as well as by the FRPI, the popula-
tion in Irumu is trapped between a rock and 
a hard place (see also Suarez 2017). Human 
rights organisations have developed a num-
ber of protection strategies and tried to 
sensitize the Congolese army, but they have 
had a limited effect on the conduct of the 
FARDC.34 This underscores MONUSCO’s dif-
ficulties in aligning the different objectives 
of its mandate; particularly, the mandates to 
protect civilians, restore the authority of the 
state and neutralise armed groups. For their 
part, FRPI members who want to demo-
bilise are caught in a dilemma. While they 
fear what the Congolese soldiers might do 
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to them if they surrender to the Congolese 
armed forces, they also fear being killed by 
their own commanders if they would be 
caught trying to leave the group.35 This all 
said, the violence in Irumu, and the stakes of 
those involved, are further evidence of how 
local and supra-local dynamics are closely 
interlinked and how security issues cover 
a wide variety of dynamics and processes 
dividing elites and populations.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from 
the 2018 upsurge of violence in the Djugu 
territory, where Lendu youth started attack-
ing Hema villages. Statements by local and 
national authorities and rumours about hid-
den support have prompted local sources to 
suggest that the attacks have been carried 
out to exploit existing tensions between 
local communities due to intensified politi-
cal competition linked inter alia to the pres-
ence of oil deposits in the province and 
the prospects of elections (Mahamba and 
Sengenya 2018). While no firm evidence 
has been brought forth in support of these 
claims, they fuel popular perceptions and 
point to the lack of popular trust in political 
elites and state authorities.
MONUSCOs Bottom-Up Approaches and 
their Limits
Besides increasing the military capacity of 
the FARDC in Irumu territory, MONUSCO 
has deployed initiatives to strengthen 
local capacities for security governance. 
To fulfil its mandate to protect the civilian 
population, MONUSCO has created several 
non-military approaches to mobilize local 
actors and strengthen local conflict preven-
tion capacities. In 2009, it launched Joint 
Protection Teams involving several sections 
of the mission. These teams gathered infor-
mation about security threats and socio-eco-
nomic conditions on the ground to produce 
recommendations for MONUSCO and the 
Congolese authorities. Even though military 
protection was provided, it proved difficult to 
collect information in remote areas because 
of a lack of contact points and poor com-
munication infrastructure. Another strategy 
was the creation and support of Community 
Alert Networks. This project aimed to 
improve communication and relations 
between MONUSCO and local populations 
in Irumu through a network of Community 
Liaison Assistants, which are in contact with 
community leaders. In case of an emergency, 
community leaders contact the liaison assis-
tant, who, in turn, inform MONUSCO of the 
security situation. Mobile phones are used 
to pass on the alerts. However, even with the 
information on immediate security threats, 
MONUSCO has struggled to mobilise the 
necessary (military) responses, particularly 
in remote areas. Moreover, local popula-
tions and leaders were afraid to be associ-
ated with the Community Liaison Assistants 
for fear of reprisals by the FRPI. According 
to one Community Liaison Assistant: ‘People 
are afraid of talking. It is only through tel-
ephone. Even the village chiefs are afraid. If 
you pass by, they are immediately suspected 
by the FRPI.36
Another protection mechanism initiated 
and supported by MONUSCO were the local 
protection committees, which were being cre-
ated in Irumu in September 2015, but were 
already operational elsewhere in Ituri. These 
committees consisted of local authorities, 
including customary leaders, who were tasked 
with preparing community protection plans. 
The main objective of this project was to cre-
ate local capacity and ownership of security 
governance and to transfer competences to 
local actors so they could help to improve 
security conditions.37 However, the effects of 
these initiatives were limited by security con-
ditions and conflict dynamics in Irumu as well 
as by Kinshasa’s security policies.
The Congolese regime considers the 
presence of armed groups a matter of 
national security and sovereignty. As a 
result, MONUSCO has been politically side-
lined on this issue (De Vries 2015; Boshoff 
et al. 2010). Yet, as is the case with several 
other community-based militias, the FRPI 
militia is not only a security problem, but 
also a political issue related to the politi-
cal and socio-economic marginalisation 
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of the Ngiti community. In the context of 
violent conflict in south Irumu, it is doubt-
ful that MONUSCO’s bottom-up initiatives 
will prove to be a solution to people’s com-
plex security problems. The extractive and 
abusive behaviour of the Congolese armed 
forces, the strong ties between the FRPI and 
the populations in Walendu-Bindi, and the 
persistence of political grievances among 
the Ngiti render it unlikely that basic secu-
rity will be restored in south Irumu in the 
short-term. Military operations have only 
further escalated the conflict and have had 
an adverse impact on the security situa-
tion. For its part, MONUSCO’s effectiveness 
is crippled by restrictive operational and 
security rules. Armed convoys are required 
to escort staff to areas where security inci-
dents have already occurred, limiting their 
flexibility and response speed. This tends 
to alienate and anger local populations in 
Irumu.38 People on the ground are unaware 
of the security restrictions and, in some 
cases, perceive the mission as complicit 
with armed groups.39 This not only raises 
fundamental questions about the use of 
violence to deal with armed groups, but also 
MONSUCO’s support to the Congolese army 
more broadly. These conditions also point 
to the limits of the current development 
of locally-rooted protection mechanisms, 
which seem to be disconnected from the 
larger politico-military power struggles of 
the region and potentially unfit for solving 
the deeper causes of insecurity.
Conclusion
Insecurity and violence remains part of 
everyday life in Ituri. To improve security 
governance, international actors have tried 
to engage with local state and non-state 
security actors. In doing so, international 
interventions have tried to strike a balance 
between supporting a regime and its secu-
rity services with a well-documented history 
of human rights abuses, and empowering 
non-state security actors based on the idea 
that these actors are considered more legiti-
mate by the population. However, there is 
reason to be sceptical that this kind of bot-
tom-up security governance is a solution to 
people’s immediate physical security needs. 
In Ituri, existing security actors tend to see 
the involvement of new actors in security 
governance as a challenge to their author-
ity and in certain cases as a potential threat 
to their income-generating activities. As 
international support to non-state security 
actors tend to directly impact the distribu-
tion of power and resources, they are likely 
to create reluctance, suspicion and resist-
ance from state security actors benefitting 
from the status quo. This suggests that secu-
rity governance is concerned with questions 
about who has the right to enforce a certain 
political order and to whom the benefits of 
security provision accrue.
The suspicious attitude of the Congolese 
security forces towards the Local Participative 
Governance Committees and even their 
colleagues in the Proximity Police should 
be understood in this light. The context of 
violent conflict in Irumu implied that local 
populations and leaders were afraid to be 
seen with the Community Liaison Assistants. 
International support to local security actors 
should, therefore, not be understood as 
the provision of a universal public good. 
Engaging with local security actors creates 
competition and suspicion as well as collab-
oration in the search for common solutions 
to shared security problems.
Our research also suggests that bottom-up 
approaches to security are unlikely to fun-
damentally improve people’s security condi-
tions in a sustainable manner if the systemic 
causes of insecurity – including ethnic ten-
sions, conflicts over natural resources, lack 
of state authority and capacity and the cli-
entilistic modus operandi of the Congolese 
security forces – continue to undermine the 
creation and support of local security gov-
ernance mechanisms. It also underscores 
MONUSCO’s difficulties in aligning the dif-
ferent objectives of its mandate; particularly, 
the mandates to protect civilians, restore the 
authority of the state and neutralise armed 
groups.
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Our research findings also align with 
other emergent critical investigations of 
the local turn in peacebuilding showing 
that it should not be assumed a priori that 
bottom-up security governance is better able 
to meet the security needs of local popula-
tions (e.g. Bagayako et al. 2016; Hoffmann 
and Kirk 2013; Meagher 2012; Wiuff 2016). 
Instead, these initiatives become embroiled 
with complex and deeply-rooted translocal 
security issues, which they are ill-equipped 
to tackle. We, therefore, suggest that future 
research endeavours to study security gov-
ernance systematically as a social space 
within which actors vie to establish authority 
over resources and people. This social space 
is not defined by scale (i.e. the local vs. non-
local), but by social relations between differ-
ent actors and networks connecting them. 
When international actors support one or 
more actors in security governance they 
make a political choice, rather than simply 
providing a public good.
Notes
 1 MONUSCO took over from an earlier 
UN peacekeeping operation: Mission 
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en 
République Démocratique du Congo 
(United Nations Organization Mission in 
the DR Congo, MONUC) on 1 July 2010.
 2 Out of the 26 interviews eight were con-
ducted with local NGO workers, one with 
an international consultant, seven with 
UN staff, six with state actors and two 
focus group interviews with non-state 
actors in Bunia.
 3 Focus group interview, youth, Saïo, 26 
September 2015; focus group inter-
view, youth, Mudzi Pela, 27 September 
2015; interview, police officer, Bunia, 29 
September 2015.
 4 Interview, university assistant, Bunia, 24 
September 2015.
 5 Group interview, youth, Saïo, 26 
September 2015.
 6 They are Bankoko, Kindia, Lembabo, 
Lumumba, Mudzi Pela, Ngezi, 
Nyakasanza, Rwambuzi, Saïo, Salongo, 
Similyabo, Sukisa.
 7 Interview, university assistant, Bunia, 24 
September 2015.
 8 Interview, consultant, local NGO, Bunia, 
23 September 2015.
 9 Interview, consultant, local NGO, Bunia, 
23 September 2015.
 10 Interview, consultant, local NGO, Bunia, 
23 September 2015; focus group inter-
view, youth, Mudzi Pela, 27 September 
2015.
 11 Bonane is a former officer in the 
“Rassemblement pour la Démocratie-
Goma” (Rally for Congolese Democracy-
Goma, RCD-G), which was backed by 
Rwanda during the second Congo War 
(1998-2003).
 12 Interview, Head of Saïo neighbourhood, 
Bunia, September 2015; interview, uni-
versity assistant, Bunia, 24 September 
2015.
 13 Focus group interview, youth, Saïo, 26 
September 2015.
 14 Focus group interview, youth, Mudzi 
Pela, 27 September 2015; Focus group 
interview, youth, Saïo, 26 September 
2015; interview, human right advocate, 
Bunia, 24 September 2015.
 15 Focus group interview, youth, Saïo, 26 
September 2015; focus group interview, 
youth, Mudzi Pela, 26 September 2015.
 16 The data was retrieved from 
PeacebuildingData.org database created 
by the Harvard Humanitarian Inititative 
and covers the period between March 
and May 2015. http://www.peacebuild-
ingdata.org/interactivemaps/drc-polls#
/?series=Poll2&indicator=7_5_4.
 17 Interview, university assistant, Bunia, 24 
September 2015.
 18 For instance, during a burial in Saïo 
neighbourhood in October 2010, the 
young gravediggers, who were alleg-
edly drunk, dropped the body in to the 
grave. The neighbourhood’s state based 
Youth Committee (Comité des jeunes) 
and the family of the deceased eventu-
ally sued the gravediggers. In solidarity 
with the gravediggers many youth from 
the neighbourhood refused to recog-
nise any youth organisations including 
Hoffmann et al: Competition, Patronage and Fragmentation $rtۃ, pageۃ oI 
the donor-funded Local Participative 
Governance Committee (CDJP 2010).
 19 Interview, international consultant, 
DFID, Copenhagen, 5 November 2015.
 20 Interview, international consultant, 
DFID, Copenhagen, 5 November 2015.
 21 Kindia, Lembabo, Mudzi Pela, Bankoko 
and Sukisa.
 22 Focus group interview, youth, Mudzi 
Pela, 27 September 2015.
 23 Focus group interview, youth, Mudzi 
Pela, 27 September 2015. To under-
stand the work conditions and daily 
struggles of survival of the Congolese 
police, see the instructive blog series: 
‘Polisi Siku Kwa Siku’ by Josaphat 
Musamba, Robert Njangala and Michel 
Thill. Available at: https://www.kpsrl.
org/series/polisi-siku-kwa-siku.
 24 Interview, local observer, Bunia, 24 
September 2015; interview, FARDC 
commander, Bunia, 26 September 
2015.
 25 Interview, civil society representative, 
Bunia, 24 September 2015.
 26 Interview, UN community liaison assis-
tants, Bunia, 29 September 2015.
 27 Interview, human rights association, 
Bunia, 28 September 2015.
 28 Interview, local observer, Bunia, 23 
September 2015; interview, local 
observer, Bunia, 24 September 2015; 
focus group interview, UN community 
liaison assistants, Bunia, 29 September 
2015.
 29 Interview, local observer, Bunia, 24 
September.
 30 Interview, local observer, Bunia, 23 
September 2015; interview, local 
observer, Bunia, 24 September 2015; 
interview, FARDC commander, Bunia, 
26 September 2015.
 31 Interview, local observer, Bunia, 24 
September 2015; interview, FARDC 
commander, Bunia, 26 September 
2015.
 32 Interview, MONUSCO staff member, 
Bunia, 27 September 2015.
 33 Interview, human rights association, 
Bunia, 28 September 2015.
 34 Interview, human rights association, 
Bunia, 28 September 2015.
 35 Focus group interview, UN community 
liaison assistants, Bunia, 29 September, 
2015.
 36 Interviews, MONUSCO staff member, 
Bunia, 27 and 29 September 2015.
 37 Interview, MOUNSCO civil affairs officer, 
27 September 2015.
 38 Interviews, MONUSCO staff member, 
Bunia, 27 and 29 September 2015.
 39 Interviews, MONUSCO staff member, 
Bunia, 27 and 29 September 2015.
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